The present experiments extended to monkeys a previously used abstract categorization procedure (Castro & Wasserman, 2016) where pigeons had categorized arrays of clipart icons based upon two task rules: the number of clipart objects in the array or the variability of objects in the array. Experiment 1 replicated Castro and Wasserman by using capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys and reported that monkeys' performances were similar to pigeons' in terms of acquisition, pattern of errors, and the absence of switch costs. Furthermore, monkeys' insensitivity to the added irrelevant information suggested that an associative (rather than rule-based) categorization mechanism was dominant. Experiment 2 was conducted to include categorization cue reversals to determine (a) whether the monkeys would quickly adapt to the reversals and inhibit interference from a prereversal task rule (consistent with a rule-based mechanism) and (b) whether the latency to make a response prior to a correct or incorrect outcome was informative about the presence of a cognitive mechanism. The cue reassignment produced profound and long-lasting performance deficits, and a long reacquisition phase suggested the involvement of associative learning processes; however, monkeys also displayed longer latencies to choose prior to correct responses on challenging trials, suggesting the involvement of nonassociative processes. Together these performances suggest a mix of associative and cognitive-control processes governing monkey categorization judgments.
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Keywords: associative learning, capuchin monkeys, cognitive control, rhesus monkeys, task switching Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xan0000174.supp Executive control, or executive functioning, refers to a collection of so-called "top-down" control processes that are used when relying on automatic processes or instinctive responses would be insufficient to complete a task (Diamond, 2013) . To illustrate, consider the differences in experience between navigating in a well-known area (e.g., driving in a home city or walking around a familiar college campus) versus a novel area (e.g., driving in an unfamiliar city or visiting a sprawling campus for the first time). In the familiar location, people can effortlessly navigate without taxing attentional resources, they can use habitual responses in a relatively static environment to their advantage, and they have enough experience in the environment that small obstacles in the route allows them to promptly adjust to taking another familiar alternate route. However, in the unfamiliar location one may need to utilize an array of executive functions to successfully navigate. This may include requiring executive attention (e.g., scanning for signs or landmarks), the inhibition of automatic responses (e.g., a driver from the U.S. may need to inhibit the impulse to drive on the right side of the road in England), and cognitive flexibility (e.g., if faced with a blocked path, having the ability to efficiently reroute to reach the destination). Executive processes such as these are considered to be more effortful than the automatic processes. They can require sustained attention, and they can be limited in the degree to which an individual can selectively and continuously engage in a task, particularly when that task requires shifting responses and periods in which inhibited action is required (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) .
Executive (controlled) processes are often contrasted with associative (automatic) processes in stimulus discrimination or categorization tasks. Executive processes include learning a discrete rule for categorizing sample stimuli to a comparison class of stimuli, and this rule-based learning (explicit categorization) is contrasted with associative systems (implicit categorization) where a stimulus is categorized not by a rule but rather by a rote association of the perceptual aspects of sample stimuli to a given comparison (see Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Dreisbach, 2012) . The investigation of executive functioning helps to clarify the underlying mechanisms that govern such categorization performances. In addition to theoretical advancement, research in executive functioning in humans is of considerable interest due to the importance of those functions in the healthy behavioral functioning of individuals (e.g., Diamond, 2013; Nigg, 2017) .
Nonhuman animal work in executive control is designed to help researchers understand the generality of these behavioral capacities across species and to help refine theories of executive functioning as it applies to humans (e.g., the necessity of language, the basic prerequisite experiences in the development of those capacities, etc.). For this reason, it is important to assess multiple species, not only for comparison to human performance, but for comparison of some species to others. The goal here is to delineate potential routes of evolutionary emergence of forms of executive control. Such assessments have shown similarities across species for certain aspects of executive functioning, but in other cases important differences among species seem to exist. Nonhuman primates have worked as a good model to assess cognitive functioning commonly found in humans (e.g., attention, inhibition, cognitive flexibility, episodic and prospective memory, selfcontrol, and metacognition; Avdagic, Jensen, Altschul, & Terrace, 2014; Beran et al., 2016; Evans & Beran, 2007; Moore, Killiany, Herndon, Rosene, & Moss, 2005; Smith, Coutinho, Church, & Beran, 2013; Stoet & Snyder, 2003a , 2003b Washburn, 1994 Washburn, , 2016 .
Comparative work into categorization performances have demonstrated cross-species differences that may elucidate the underlying mechanisms. Smith, Beran, Crossley, Boomer, and Ashby (2010) gave humans and rhesus macaques a categorization task that required categorizations to be based on stimulus differences that varied on one-dimensional criteria (e.g., bar width or bar orientations, simple rule-based categorization) or based on stimuli differences simultaneously varying across the two dimensions where no single categorization rule could account for the differences, but prolonged training would allow acquisition of the categorization based on abstract perceptual features. Both species acquired the rule-based task more quickly, suggesting that both species can learn explicit rules to expedite categorization performances that would otherwise be learned slowly and implicitly. Smith et al. (2012) expanded upon this research by including capuchin monkeys and pigeons. The capuchin monkeys' performances demonstrated a rule-based mechanism for one-dimensional categorizations; by contrast, pigeons did not benefit from learning on a one-dimension categorization task in comparison to the twodimension categorization task. The pigeons learned both tasks at the same pace and with gradual improvement, suggesting that associative processes were primarily utilized in the acquisition of the categorization tasks. Thus, there would appear to be a discontinuity between primate and pigeon categorization cognition. This raises the question of whether there might be a similar discontinuity in executive control cognition that relies on categorization tasks.
To compare cognitive control mechanisms (sometimes referred to as low-level executive functions, which include attention, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility; Nigg, 2017) with associative mechanisms, a categorization task is arranged where compound stimuli are sorted based upon a single target aspect dimension, but salient irrelevant dimensions may interfere with performances. For example, the classic Stroop (1935) task demonstrated such interference by showing that people had greater difficulty classifying the color of a printed word if the written word referred to a different color. To assess attentional and inhibition capacities of cognitive control in nonhuman primates, Washburn (1994) used a numerical version of the classic Stroop task where rhesus monkeys had to choose the larger of two arrays of numeric or alphabetic symbols. These monkeys had previous experience discriminating the ordinal value of numerals, and the monkeys made more errors when the larger array was composed of relatively smaller-valued numerals (e.g., two "4"s compared with three "1"s). This effect is consistent with what is found in humans on the Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991) . Washburn argued that this was an interference effect (as opposed to being a byproduct of associative conditioning) by reporting that the effect increased in magnitude on trials where the difference between the symbolic meanings were large, and this effect could not be accounted for by the reinforcement histories established through those choices. Washburn (2016) also conducted a numerical Stroop task with rhesus monkeys and humans and reported that humans showed similar interference effects in the numerical Stroop task as monkeys, but the magnitude of the interference effects was greater in monkeys. Such interference effects are often regarded as being mediated through an associative mechanism in humans because of those effects being unaffected by working memory load manipulations but modulated by the degree to which those stimuli were associated (Kiesel, Wendt, & Peters, 2007) . However, cognitive control processes may help subjects attenuate the degree to which such interference disrupts their behavior. Overall, humans and rhesus monkeys appear similar in that they both show interference problems that tax their attentional and inhibitory processes, although humans appear to be more successful in their controlled processing to overcome such interference.
The task-switching paradigm is another method that can assess the controlled processing and cognitive flexibility aspects of cognitive control. In task-switching procedures, subjects are exposed to a compound stimulus and across trials they are tasked with categorizing one of the stimulus attributes of the compound. Often humans show a switch cost, which translates into longer response latencies when the stimulus attribute they are tasked to categorize is switched, rather than repeated, across trials (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Monsell, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010) . In humans, the degree of cognitive flexibility of an individual is indicated by the inverse of the magnitude of those switch costs and may involve processes that include attention to stimulus aspects, recalling rules into working memory, and inhibition of prior trial events (Monsell, 2003) . Nonhuman animals, however, seldom show any switch costs, suggesting that a different mechanism is involved in the decisionmaking process. Stoet and Snyder (2003a) presented rhesus monkeys and humans with a comparable task-switching procedure and reported that the monkeys did not show strong overall evidence of switch costs, but did show strong interference costs (i.e., more errors during incongruent trials where the compound stimulus would elicit conflicting responses). Humans, on the other hand, showed switch costs, but no interference costs in this task. Caselli and Chelazzi (2011) did report switch costs in rhesus macaques in a task switching procedure that used color and line orientation categorization tasks. However, Avdagic et al. (2014) suggested that these results might be an outlier in the literature due to limited task training. Avdagic et al. (2014) used a task-switching procedure that involved rhesus monkeys making a chain of four responses to a circle stimulus that varied in the radius-size or luminosity dimensions in an ordered direction of dimension intensity. The monkeys did not show any switch costs but did show This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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interference costs when the two dimensions both varied across the four levels and this interference effect endured through a prolonged training period. Together, these studies may suggest that monkeys are a limited model for human cognitive control; however, Stoet and Snyder (2003b) showed that monkeys had fewer errors and faster RTs in a task-switching procedure when they had more time to prepare for a response. This outcome is consistent with research showing that human switch costs are partly a function of the time available to prepare a response (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) . Additionally, Smith et al. (2010) demonstrated that rhesus monkeys do appear to categorize based upon task-rules. However, this was not using a task switching procedure, but instead a unitary categorization that had compound stimuli, and monkeys do appear to, like humans, encode task-rules in the prefrontal cortex (Bongard & Nieder, 2010; Nakahara, Hayashi, Konishi, & Miyashita, 2002; Stoet & Snyder, 2009 ). Thus, the question might not be whether monkeys have cognitive control capacities, but under what conditions those capacities are utilized to solve a problem. Monkeys appear to be a good model of categorization processes and an approximate model for human cognitive control, and given the results from Smith et al. (2012) one might suspect that pigeons might fail in that capacity. Pigeons are regarded as a standard model for associative learning, and Smith et al. (2012) demonstrated that pigeons did not show a predisposition to rapidly acquire a rule-based categorization with unidimensional stimuli that was found in humans, rhesus macaques and tufted capuchin monkeys. However, Lea and Wills (2008) have argued that human advantages in categorization performances with unidimensional stimuli might not reflect the presence of a rule-based cognitive process that separates humans from other animals. Wills et al. (2009) have reported that pigeons and humans (and gray squirrels) show similar performances in their abilities to learn to categorize multielement stimuli based upon overall similarity of the elements. That is, all species had a similar tendency to either follow a strategy of grouping stimuli by abstract similarity and grouping use of a single dimensional aspect (i.e., following a rule). Thus, given Smith et al. (2012) , there appears to be a species difference between pigeons, as compared to monkeys and humans, in the rate of acquisition for categorizing a unidimensional stimulus, and this may suggest differences in the cognitive capacities involved in making a categorization. However, such a difference would not suggest that pigeons are incapable of learning to categorize based upon rules (Wills et al., 2009) .
Pigeons have demonstrated the ability to flexibly navigate a task-switching procedure and to overcome the interference effects caused by compound stimuli (Castro & Wasserman, 2016; Meier, Lea, & McLaren, 2016a) . The pigeons' success in cognitive control tasks raises the question of whether those tasks can be solved associatively or whether pigeons have a rudimentary processes of cognitive control. Although birds do not have a prefrontal cortex, they have a structural analogue-the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL; Güntürkün, 2012)-and Veit and Nieder (2013) reported that carrion crows could successfully navigate a task-switching procedure and that NCL activity (like prefrontal cortex activity in primates; Wallis, Anderson, & Miller, 2001) was correlated with this specific task. Meier et al., (2016a) arranged a task-switching procedure and reported that pigeons, like macaques, demonstrated an interference effect when a stimulus compound included aspects that cued incongruent responses. But, pigeons did not show any switch costs. Meier et al. argued that pigeons' performances might be due to associative processes by demonstrating that pigeons showed sensitivity to sequence effects that are well-described by an associative model of learning. Meier, Lea, and McLaren (2016b) compared human and pigeon performances on a categorization procedure and reported that pigeons failed to learn the task in a condition where they did not peck on the comparison stimulus directly but pecked on a white disk to make a selection; thus, pigeons' acquisition necessitated an associative component to learning. Humans' performances were not affected by the response modality. Most humans acquired the task, but only those individuals that could verbalize the rule.
Castro and Wasserman (2016) utilized an abstract categorization task, requiring pigeons to classify the quantity or variability in an array of clipart icons, to assess whether pigeons displayed cognitive control. In the quantity task, pigeons had to choose between arrays of 6 icons (low quantity) or 16 icons (high quantity), depending on the background color cue that signaled both the task and the appropriate array to select. In the variability task, pigeons had to choose between an array with all of the icons represented by the same clipart object (low variability) and an array of icons where each icon represented a different clipart object (high variability). The arrays were a composite of the quantity and variability dimensions to permit assessment of interference effects. Castro and Wasserman reported that the pigeons did learn this task, providing a degree of evidence for cognitive control in pigeons, although the pigeons did not show any switch costs. They also reported that accuracy was higher in trials where the composite of the target array shared the same high dimensional magnitude; that is, accuracy was higher when the target array had high quantity and when the irrelevant dimension had high variability, or when the target array was high variability and the irrelevant dimension was high quantity. The implicit interference caused by incongruent target-irrelevant dimension magnitudes suggested that the pigeons were ordering the two dimensions along a general magnitude dimension (Gallistel & Gelman, 2000) and that the incongruence of those magnitudes represented an implicit source of interference. Thus, a number of studies suggest that pigeons do show cognitive control-like performances, but this might be obtained through an associative process rather than a rule-learned process that is hypothesized to govern human performances.
Overall, it appears that pigeons and monkeys can solve taskswitching problems, but it is not yet certain whether associative learning can account for some or much of those performances. Comparatively, there is some dissociation between categorization processes in pigeons, monkeys, and humans that require further study. Pigeons and monkeys do not show evidence of switch costs such as is often found in humans (Meier et al., 2016a; Monsell, 2003; Stoet & Snyder, 2003a) , and humans and monkeys have an advantage in acquiring a unidimensional rule-based categorization that is not apparent in pigeons (Smith et al., 2010 (Smith et al., , 2012 . Furthermore, there is discussion on whether performances that suggest cognitive control in nonhuman animals might be a product of associative mechanisms, at least in pigeons (Meier et al., 2016a (Meier et al., , 2016b . Thus, the principal goal for the present experiments is a comparative assessment of monkey categorization performances in relation to the already reported pigeon performances and to evaluate whether those performances appear to reflect a cognitive control system or an associative system in nonhuman animals. The This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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TASK SWITCHING IN MONKEYS present procedure is borrowed from Castro and Wasserman (2016) and applied to rhesus and tufted capuchin monkeys.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to introduce the Castro and Wasserman (2016) procedure to two monkey species (tufted capuchin monkeys and rhesus macaques) and evaluate how monkeys performed on a comparable procedure. When faced with two arrays of clipart icons that were a composite of icons that varied both in the quantity and variability dimensions, the monkeys had to choose the appropriate task dimension and the appropriate level (high or low magnitude) of that dimension that was signaled by a categorization cue (a numeral and the screen background color). Monkeys acquired this task under conditions where the irrelevant dimension (i.e., the dimension other than the one indicated by screen color) was held constant between the two compound arrays (similar to Castro & Wasserman, 2016 , Experiment 1). Castro and Wasserman reported that pigeons displayed lower accuracy when the magnitude of the target array did not match the magnitude of the irrelevant dimension (which they attributed to the effects of a general magnitude system, Gallistel & Gelman, 2000) . If the monkeys replicate this characteristic in the data, that would suggest that they were using a categorization process similar to pigeons. Following acquisition, the monkeys transitioned to a condition where the irrelevant dimension was varied between the two options (i.e., both array choices varied in terms of the target dimension and the irrelevant dimension, comparable with Castro and Wasserman, Experiment 2). If the monkeys' performances were rule-governed, then the additional information caused by having the irrelevant dimension varied between the arrays may result in a performance disruption attributable to the monkeys having to remember which dimension was relevant for that trial. Alternatively, if the monkeys had associatively memorized the target dimension aspect corresponding to the categorization cue background color (i.e., the task was effectively a discrimination that was associatively learned), then there should be no disruption in performances.
We also evaluated whether monkeys demonstrated any evidence of switch costs. Although such costs were not found in pigeons using this task (Castro & Wasserman, 2016) , assuming monkeys learn the task differently than pigeons, evidence of some form of switch costs might be present. However, such costs are conspicuously absent when using nonhuman primates (Avdagic et al., 2014; Stoet & Snyder, 2003a , 2003b ) and the present study may prove no exception.
Method
Subjects. Six adult male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and nine adult tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella; four males and five females) participated in this experiment. Monkeys were not food-deprived or weight-reduced, and they had free access to water at all times. The apparatus required the monkeys to operate a joystick to move an onscreen cursor to earn pellets according to the programmed contingencies. Rhesus monkeys (Richardson, Washburn, Hopkins, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Rumbaugh, 1990 ) and capuchin monkeys (Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & Menzel, 2008) had extensive experience working with this system. Rhesus monkeys started working at 0900 h for 4 to 5 days a week and capuchin monkeys worked between 1030 and 1430 h for 3 days a week. This study complied with approved Georgia State University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) protocols and the United States Department of Agriculture Animal Welfare Act, and the "Guidelines for the Use of Laboratory Animals." Georgia State University is accredited by the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC).
Apparatus. The monkeys operated the Language Research Center's Computerized Test System (LRC-CTS; Richardson et al., 1990) to participate in this experiment. This system consisted of a personal computer with color monitor, digital joystick, and food pellet dispenser. The monkeys manipulated a joystick outside of the cage by reaching through the cage mesh or through a hole in the mesh designed to allow access to the joystick. The joystick controlled a cursor on a computer monitor, and the computer was programmed to deliver banana flavored pellets (94 mg for macaques and 45 mg for capuchins; Bioserve, Frenchtown, NJ), as a consequence for correct responses, through a dispenser interfaced to the computer using a relay box and output board (Keithley Instruments, Cleveland, OH).
Design and procedure. The experimental design and the program determining the procedural contingencies were identical for both monkey species. Trials started with a trial-initiation period with the word "Start!" in the upper-center part of the screen, and a cursor was located at the lower-center part of the screen (see Figure 1 ). Once the cursor was moved to contact the "Start!" icon then two stimulus array samples were presented on the left and right side of the screen. The arrays included arbitrary cartoon clipart icons (randomly selected, with replacement, out of a set of 250 possible icons) that appeared in a random location within a 5 (horizontal) by 8 (vertical) grid. The arrays varied in clipart quantity containing either 6 items (Low-Q) or 16 items (High-Q) and clipart variability containing either all the same icons (Low-V) or all different icons (High-V). Moving the cursor to contact the array recorded a choice. The target array was randomly located on the left or right side across trials. A correct response resulted in a chime, the delivery of a pellet, and a 0.5-s intertrial interval (ITI) leading to the next trial's trial-initiation period. An incorrect response resulted in a buzz, a 20-s ITI, and a following correction trial that repeated the prior trial type (although with new clipart icons at different locations).
The two different tasks (quantity and variability categorizations) with two different levels of the dimension magnitude (high quantity or variability and low quantity or variability) allowed for four different possible trial types (requiring the monkey to choose High-Q, Low-Q, High-V, or Low-V arrays; e.g., the columns in Figure 2 ). Trial types were randomly presented with a categorization-cue corresponding with the array type that would result in food reward. Categorizationcues were composed of a background color and an Arabic numeral (1-4, located on the top-center of the screen) that was associated with each of the four possible trial types. In the presence of the number "1" and a red screen color, the High-V array was correct (Red1). In the presence of the number "2" and a blue screen color, the Low-V array was correct (Blue2). In the presence of the number "3" and a gray screen color, the High-Q array was correct (Gray3). In the presence of the number "4" and the gold screen color, the Low-Q array was correct (Gold4). The numerals were not expected to designate any type of actual numerical information but rather were used as a redunThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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SMITH AND BERAN dant categorization cue to the animal, and an easy indicator to human observers about the trial condition. Two conditions varied the homogeneity of the irrelevant dimension (homogeneity factor: identical vs. differential) between the two stimulus arrays (i.e., the irrelevant dimension was either the same between both the target array and the foil, or the irrelevant dimension was different between those two arrays). In the first condition, the Identical Irrelevant Dimension (IID) condition, the irrelevant dimension was always the same between the two arrays (e.g., Figure 2 , rows A and B) and only the target dimension varied between the two arrays across trials. However, the magnitude of the irrelevant dimension that was applied to both array options would vary between trials (e.g., in a Red1 trial, High-V was the target array, Low-V was the foil, and the irrelevant dimension of the compound could either be High-Q or Low-Q on the two arrays). The magnitude of the target array option and the associated irrelevant dimension could either be equivalent (both high or both low; Figure 2 , rows A and C) or nonequivalent (one high and the other low; Figure 2 , rows B and D) across trials and this factor (equivalency factor: equivalent vs. nonequivalent) captures the congruency of the magnitude between the two dimensions. This resulted in eight possible trial presentations in the IID condition (4 trial types ϫ 2 levels of the dimension-magnitude equivalency factor). The IID condition was continued until the acquisition criterion was met. Acquisition criterion for this, and all subsequent conditions, was defined as 80% or higher overall accuracy for 20 (not necessarily consecutive) 100-trial blocks. Following acquisition, the monkeys experienced a test probe session with least 500 probe trials, in which a set of clipart icons unused during training were used to fill the arrays. The test probe stimuli set also included 250 possible clipart icons. The inclusion of novel stimuli was necessary to evaluate whether the monkeys were using specific stimuli from training as a potential cue. Following acquisition and tests in the IID condition, a second condition (Differential Irrelevant Dimension condition [DID] ) arranged for the irrelevant dimension magnitude to always be heterogeneous between the both arrays (e.g., Figure 2 , rows C and D). The DID condition continued until the same accuracy criterion was met and then a test probe session followed as in the IID condition.
Data analysis. All analyses were conducted using the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2014) to fit a generalized linear mixed effects model to the data. All of the factors were effect-coded, and those factors were included as random effects at the individual subject level to satisfy the repeated-measures assumption (Gelman & Hill, 2007) . The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was used for model selection and following model selection a likelihood ratio test was conducted to report the likelihood that the experimental model fit the data better than the alternative null model that represents the simpler version of the experimental model excluding the factor of interest (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) . Tukey pairwise comparisons (using the lsmeans package in R; Lenth & Hervé, 2014) were reported to highlight the specific differences relevant to the hypotheses, using the Wald test to produce p values (␣ ϭ .05). For brevity, results from the best fitting model will be reported in the paper and supplementary materials will include a summary of results for the full model and include the numerous tables with the complete statistical results. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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To fully characterize performance between trial types across the conditions, a global model was fit to the cumulative number of errors accrued within a condition as a function of the target trial type (High-Q, Low-Q, High-V, and Low-V), the equivalency factor (equivalent and nonequivalent), the homogeneity conditions (IID and DID) and their interaction. The cumulative number of errors are measured as discrete values and the model specified a Poisson error distribution for the outcome factor. The random effects structure was varied at the individual-subject level and included all the factors and their interactions.
A local accuracy model measured response accuracy in 500-trial blocks that covered the first 500-trials (preacquisition), trials 3500 -4000 (midacquisition), and the final 500 trials (postacquisition) in the IID condition, and the first 500 trials and last 500 trials of the DID condition. The local models use each individual trial (rather than an aggregate of trials) to model the data. With thousands of trials per subject and condition, it is intractable to include the full data set to model the data. Thus, 500-trial snapshots of performance were used here. The global model is intended to summarize the performances for the full condition. The full model predicted response accuracy as a function of trial block (phase factor: IID-PRE, IID-MID, IID-POST, DID-PRE, and DID-POST), dimension equivalency (equivalent, nonequivalent), task-switching (task-switch, task-repeat), and their interactions. The model specified a binomial distribution for the outcome variable (1 ϭ correct, 0 ϭ incorrect) to allow a logistic regression to be fitted to the accuracy data. The random effects structure allowed the slope and the main effects to vary independently for each individual subject but did not include the interaction terms.
A full local latency model assessed the latency to make a choice (timed from the moment the monkeys transitioned from trialinitiation to the time they selected an array) as a function of trial-block (the same five levels specified in the above response accuracy model), dimension equivalency, task-switching, response outcome (correct or incorrect trial outcome), and their interactions. The random effects structure varied at the individual subject level and let the slope and the fixed effects factors vary, but not their interactions. Only values less than or equal to 10 s were included because latencies over 10 s were considered extreme (Ͻ1% of the data were excluded with this criterion). The average latency to make a categorization response was positively skewed and the model specified a gamma distribution with a logarithmic link function for that outcome variable to adequately model the data of such a distribution.
To assess whether there were differences accounted for by species, the local analyses included the species factor (capuchin and macaque), trial-block, equivalency factor, and their interaction. To assess whether familiar clipart icons affected performances, the test probe data compared test trials and training trials (test-phase factor) to predict categorization accuracy. The magnitudes of the irrelevant dimension are varied between both arrays. Rows A and C: The magnitude of the dimension for the target array is equivalent to the magnitude of the irrelevant dimension on the target array (e.g., the target for A1 is high-variability and the irrelevant dimension on that array is high-numerosity). Rows B and D: The magnitude of the dimension for the target array is equivalent to the magnitude of the irrelevant dimension on the target array (e.g., the target for B1 is high-variability and the irrelevant dimension on that array is low-numerosity). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
SMITH AND BERAN

Results
The best fitting model excluded the test-phase factor. The test probe trial and training trial accuracy were similar for both magnitude-equivalent and magnitude-nonequivalent trials (ϳ 94% training vs. 93% test-probe accuracy). There were no significant species differences between capuchin monkeys and rhesus macaques in terms of accuracy and latency to make a choice, as the best fitting models for both time and accuracy excluded the species factor. Table 1 shows the number of 100-trial blocks necessary to reach the acquisition criterion of 80% or greater accuracy (excluding correction trials) for at least 20 blocks. Overall, monkeys required between 6,700 trials (Lou) or 38,100 trials (Chewie) to reach acquisition criteria. The median trials to acquisition was 15,700 trials for the IID condition and 2,700 trials for the DID condition. The top two fastest monkeys to reach acquisition criteria were Lou (a rhesus monkey) and Logan (a capuchin monkey) and at the slowest monkeys to reach acquisition criteria were Wren (a capuchin monkey) and Chewie (a rhesus monkey)-further demonstrating that there was not a species difference in performance in this task.
Global analysis. Figure 3 shows the cumulative errors for both conditions in Experiment 1. For the IID condition, there were more cumulative errors for equivalent trials than the nonequivalent trials for the High-Q (z ϭ 4.86, p Ͻ .001) and High-V (879 vs. 626, z ϭ 10.68, p Ͻ .001) trial types. However, although there were more errors in the nonequivalent trials than the equivalent trials for the Low-V (764 vs. 611, z ϭ Ϫ5.55, p Ͻ .001) trial types, there was no difference in the number of errors between the equivalent and nonequivalent Low-Q trials (1,059 vs. 994, z ϭ Ϫ2.04, p ϭ .81). Thus, dimensionmagnitude nonequivalence interference effects were present when the high dimension-magnitudes were overlaid (High-Q with High-V or High-V with High-Q), but not when the low dimension-magnitudes were overlaid. In the DID condition, there were no differences in the cumulative errors across dimension-magnitude equivalencies for any of the trial types (ps Ͼ .90).
Accuracy. The best fitting model included the homogeneity condition factor, equivalency factor, and phase factor. The model with the switch cost factor did not perform better than a model excluding that factor (i.e., null model). The model including the equivalency factor was more likely than the model excluding that factor, 2 (11) ϭ 62.04, p Ͻ .001. Figure 4 (top five panels) shows the model fits for the overall proportion correct categorizations (fixed effects) and proportion correct categorizations for individual subjects (random effects). Individual subject plots show the consistency of the effects across all subjects. Overall, accuracy started off near chance for both equivalent and nonequivalent trial types for the preacquisition 500-trial block (PRE-phase) of the IID condition, increased in the MID-phase (ϳ65-80%), and was greater than 90% in the POST-phase of the IID condition. Accuracy did not decrease upon transition from the postacquisition IID phase to the preacquisition DID phase for equivalent (94% to 93%; z ϭ 1.74, p ϭ .77) and nonequivalent trial types (93% to 92%; z ϭ 1.28, p ϭ .96).
The first trial-block in the preacquisition phase of the IID condition did not show any evidence of interference caused by dimension-magnitude equivalence, (51% correct congruent vs. 53% correct incongruent; z ϭ 0.88, p ϭ .99). Accuracy, however, was greater in the equivalent dimension-magnitude than the nonequivalent dimension-magnitude trials for the midacquisition component (74% vs. 67%; z ϭ Ϫ3.91, p ϭ .004), demonstrating interference from dimension-magnitude nonequivalence. This was not true for the postacquisition trial-block for the IID condition (94% vs. 93%; z ϭ Ϫ2.65, p ϭ .20), the preacquisition trial-block for the DID condition (93% vs. 92%; z ϭ Ϫ1.42, p ϭ .92), and the postacquisition trial-block for the DID condition (95% vs. 94%; z ϭ Ϫ1.42, p ϭ .92). The high levels of accuracy following the postacquisition trials likely resulted in a ceiling effect that occluded the detection of interference effects.
Choice time. The best performing model included the phase and outcome factors. The model including the task-switch factor and equivalency factor did not perform better than the null models. The model including the outcome factor, 2 (17) ϭ 12,016, p Ͻ .001 was over 1,000 times more likely than the null model. Figure  4 (bottom five panels) shows the response latency between the trial congruency and trial outcome, and across components. Initially, there was a trend for longer latency for the correct responses (1.80 s) than for incorrect responses (1.71 s) in the preacquisition phase of the IID condition (z ϭ Ϫ3.46, p ϭ .02). However, by the midacquisition phase there was no difference between correct and 
Discussion
Both species of monkeys successfully learned to flexibly categorize arrays of clipart icons between two tasks, and there was no meaningful difference in accuracy and choice latency between the two monkey species. There were no a priori hypotheses to expect a difference in performance between capuchins and macaques, as Smith et al. (2012) showed that both macaques and capuchins appeared to learn the rule-based categorization faster than the more abstract categorization, suggesting similar cognitive capacities. Categorization performances were better on trial types where the quantity dimension and the variability dimension shared a high magnitude, and this outcome is identical to what was reported with pigeons in Experiment 1 of Castro and Wasserman (2016) . This further supports the claim that stimuli that share a common magnitude level benefit by being implicitly "congruent," and this may suggest that the pigeons and the two monkey species were recruiting similar processes to solve the categorization problems in this task.
The absence of evidence for switch costs in response accuracy and response latency data is in agreement with most other taskswitching experiments in nonhuman animals and does not support a hypothesis that monkeys encode this categorization task as involving two rules that needed to be accessed across trials (Monsell, 2003) . Rather, they appeared to learn the categorization cue's association with the perceptual features of the arrays' quantity and variability. This argument is supported by the observation that the transition from the IID condition to the DID condition did not disrupt performances due to the added irrelevant information provided by both arrays. The monkeys may not have attended to the differences in irrelevant dimension between the two arrays. Rather, if the monkeys learned the association between the categorization cue and the target array aspect, then the added information would be irrelevant, and the monkeys would perform accurately and continue to make correct responses promptly (which was observed).
Latency to make a choice did not seem to be affected by the equivalency of the dimension-magnitudes in the same way that accuracy was affected. The effect on accuracy was not substantial (e.g., ϳ7% accuracy difference in midacquisition), so the effect on latency might have been too small to detect. However, choice latencies were shorter for correct trials than incorrect trials later in training, and this may indicate that the monkeys were able to identify the correct array with an automatic/ habitual response reminiscent of an associative system. In contrast, early in training there was a trend for latencies to be longer prior to a correct response, and this may hint at a possible cognitive mechanism at play, where the monkeys may have had to pay attention and process the trial to arrive at the correct choice (e.g., as in the Stroop task; MacLeod, 1991). Longer choice latencies also might be predicted early in training due to an associative system, as incorrect responses would result in response-extinction and hinder response strength (Skinner, 1938) . However, the associative account (or at least a simple version of one) cannot easily explain the differences where there were shorter latencies prior to a correct response and longer latencies prior to an incorrect response.
Finally, the monkeys' categorization performances were not disrupted by using the withheld set of clipart icons in the test trials. Given that the monkeys were adept at this categorization task when the clipart locations were varied (icons randomly placed in the grids), when clipart icons were varied (always different clipart icons in the mix across trials), and when novel clipart sets were used, this demonstrates that the monkeys were making their judgments based upon the abstract properties of "quantity" and "variability," rather than using specific features of stimuli. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated a modest relationship between the dimension-magnitude equivalency between the target and irrelevant dimensions but did not demonstrate a predicted difference between pigeons and monkeys. Given that there are claims that pigeons solve task switching procedures associatively (Meier et al., 2016a) , that may suggest that monkeys do so as well. Experiment 2 reverses the categorization cue assignments to produce associative interference (e.g., like the Stroop effect) to further test monkey cognitive control capacities.
Experiment 2 immediately followed Experiment 1 and started on a Baseline condition that included all of the 16 possible trial types (see Figure 2 ) trained in the IID and DID conditions in Experiment 1 to establish high proficiency (ϳ 95% correct) in the task. Thus, in Experiment 2 the homogeneity factor did not vary between conditions but did vary between trials. Following the Baseline condition, the categorization cues (background colors and numerals) signaling the appropriate dimension and dimension-magnitude were reassigned in two reversal conditions (see Figure 5 for illustration). Both reversals involved an Figure 4 . Experiment 1 -the top five panels depict the proportion correct categorizations as a function of trial type dimension-magnitude equivalency and the bottom five panels depict the latency to make a choice (sec) as a function of whether the choice was subsequently rewarded (Correct) or not (Incorrect). The individual panels represent the first 500 trials (PRE), Trials 3500 -4000 (MID), last 500 trials (POST) for the Identical Irrelevant dimension condition, and the first (PRE) and last (POST) 500 trials in the Differential Irrelevant dimension condition. Plots show overall group (fixed) effects and individual subject (random) effects; the error bars represent the SEM ‫ء‬ 2 of the fixed effects. Note the variable y axes for accuracy plots and consistent axes for choice-time plots. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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extradimensional shift, where the irrelevant dimension became the relevant dimension (and vice versa) for a given categorization cue (Slamecka, 1968) . In the Single Reversal condition the cues were reassigned to a new dimension (i.e., task reversal), but the task magnitudes were still the same (e.g., Gray3, that previously signaled high-quantity, was reassigned to signal high-variability). In the Double Reversal condition the cues were reassigned to a new dimension and to a new task magnitude (e.g., task and magnitude reversals such that, Gray3 that previously signaled high-quantity was reassigned to signal lowvariability). A return-to-baseline condition followed acquisition in the reversal condition. The first rationale for this experiment was to produce a profound source of interference caused by the reversals and to assess how efficiently the monkeys could readapt to the new contingencies. If the monkeys had learned the task rule, then they should reacquire the return-to-baseline condition (where the monkeys had direct prior experience with that task and those specific task rules) promptly relative to the acquisition phase experienced in Experiment 1; alternatively, if the monkeys had learned the task associatively, then they should slowly and progressively reacquire the appropriate cueresponse association. However, because humans and nonhuman primates (marmosets) required several trials to task reacquisition on novel extradimensional shifts in previous research (Roberts, Robbins, & Everitt, 1988 ), we would not predict prompt acquisition for the reversal conditions. The second rationale for Experiment 2 was to evaluate the nature of the profound associative interference caused by the reversal, if that was observed. In humans, reversals in a task-switching procedure resulted in associative interference attributable to the formerly learned cue-task associations (Gade & Koch, 2007) , and reacquisition was slower in a cue reversal condition compared with a condition where novel cues were used. In Experiment 2, like in the Stroop effect with humans (MacLeod, 1991), the monkeys were required to inhibit a dominant response tendency that was derived from prolonged experience gained in the Baseline condition. Specifically, immediately following an extradimensional reversal, the monkeys should continue to respond to the irrelevant dimension-magnitude that was the former target dimension-magnitude in the prior condition. For example (see Figure 6 ), consider a differential irrelevant dimension trial in the Single Reversal condition with a Gray3 trial (where the target array was high-quantity in the baseline conditions, but high-variability in the Single Reversal condition). On Single Reversal condition trials where the irrelevant dimension overlaid on the target array displayed high-quantity (the target Gray3 array in the prereversal contingencies; Figure 6 , panel B1) the monkeys should display higher than chance level accuracy not due to appropriately tracking the high-variability array, but because they tracked the irrelevant dimension (high quantity) that coincidently was overlaid on the target array and this resulted in the correct choice (i.e., facilitative trial types). Alternatively, if the irrelevant dimension overlaid in the target array had low-quantity (the foil Gray3 array in the prereversal contingencies; Figure 6 , panel B2), then the monkeys following the baseline task rules would frequently get that trial wrong because of their tendency to continue to respond to the foil dimension with high-quantity-driving accuracy to below chance (i.e., disruptive trial types). These interference effects should only occur on trials with differential irrelevant dimensions (e.g., like in the DID condition in Experiment 1; Figure 6 panels B1 and B2). Because the identical irrelevant dimension trials include the same irrelevant dimension on both arrays, the irrelevant dimension should not differentially affect categorization performance (e.g., Gray3 with high-quantity or low-quantity on both array options, Figure 6 , panels A1 and A2). In that case, the monkeys should initially perform at chance because they are not yet tracking the relevant dimension, and the irrelevant dimension is the same between the two array options. Note that for identical irrelevant dimension trials the term "disruptive" or "facilitative" trial type does not quite fit; however, this paper This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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SMITH AND BERAN continues to reference a facilitative and disruptive trial types whenever the irrelevant dimension overlaid on the target array was previously the target array in the prior condition (e.g., Figure 6 , panel A1) or previously the foil array in the prior condition (e.g., Figure 6 , panel A2).
The reversal should immediately produce strong associative interference effects on accuracy for DID trials. Acquisition training for Experiment 2 continued until all trial types showed 80% or greater accuracy for at least 2,000 trials; if the monkeys demonstrated strong executive attention and inhibition capacities, then the effects of facilitative and disruptive trial types should be attenuated, in the DID trials, when the criterion was reached. IID trials effectively functioned as a control condition-where no disruptive effects should be possible. However, interference in DID trials may persist after an extensive training period comparable to what was reported in Avdagic et al. (2014) .
The return-to-baseline conditions reintroduced monkeys to the Baseline condition and determined whether the monkeys rapidly recognized and remembered the task rules, which would be reflected in a better than chance categorization accuracy. Such an outcome would not necessarily reflect the monkeys recalling a task-rule and applying it, as such an outcome could also reflect a recovery of the previously learned associations. However, if accuracy in the returnto-baseline condition is promptly higher than chance and showing minor (relative to the reversal condition) facilitation/disruption effects stemming from the reversal contingencies, that might suggest the monkeys were applying an old task rule to govern their categorizations.
Experiment 2 also allowed for a more extensive evaluation for what was causing the choice latency results reported in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 the monkeys showed longer latencies prior to a correct response early in acquisition, but shorter latencies prior to a correct response late in acquisition. One possibility is that this was attributable to the monkeys not yet having learned the overall procedural contingencies (i.e., attending to the irrelevant dimension color/numeral cues and attending to the quantity and variability aspects of the arrays) in addition to the task rules (i.e., knowing which categorization cue was signaling which array aspect). If this was the case, then one would predict that upon entering the reversal condition the monkeys would continue to show short latencies prior to a correct response. Alternatively, if the longer latencies prior to correct responses reflected a process involved in cognitive conflict resolution, then one would expect the return of a longer latency prior to a correct response (followed by shorter correct latencies following reacquisition to the new task rules). Likewise, Experiment 2 allowed us to determine how response latencies were affected by a profound interference effect caused by the reversal. If the latency prior to a correct response was longer in disruptive trials compared with facilitative trials (or trials with identical irrelevant dimensions), that would indicate that the longer latencies prior to a correct response are related to task difficulty, whether that difficulty is caused by preacquisition uncertainty or interference effects. Thus, such an effect might be best explained by a cognitive process that is designed to enable adaptive performances.
Method
Subjects. The same monkeys from Experiment 1 participated in this experiment, with the exception of Wren (who only provided data for the baseline conditions and the Single Reversal condition) and Widget (who only provided data for the baseline conditions and the Double Reversal condition), because of disruption in testing caused by necessary and extended facility construction events.
Apparatus. Apparatuses were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Procedure. Experiment 2 used the same general programmed contingencies that were used in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1) . The Baseline condition (BASE) followed immediately from the DID condition in Experiment 1 and included both identical and differential irrelevant dimension trial types (heterogeneity factor) intermixed in the same sessions. This resulted in 16 possible trial presentations (4 Categorization types ϫ 2 Irrelevant dimension homogeneity levels ϫ 2 Facilitative/disruptive interference levels; Figure 2 illustrates all possible trial types). Following the Baseline condition, there were reversal conditions where the categorization cues (screen color and numeral) were reassigned to occasion new target categorizations. The conditions included a Single-Reversal condition (SR), a DoubleReversal condition (DR), a Single Return-to-Baseline condition (SRB), and a Double Return-to-Baseline condition (DRB). The returnto-baseline conditions (SRB and DRB) always followed the reversal conditions (SR and DR). The reversal conditions rearranged the assigned categorization cue to the appropriate target response ( Figure 5 shows the cue reversals for the two conditions in reference to the baseline condition). In the SR condition the screen color cues were reassigned in such a way that the cues for the dimensions (i.e., "quantity" vs. "variability") were interchanged from their baseline assignments, but the magnitudes corresponding to the cues were kept the same (i.e., "high" vs. "low"). In the SR condition, Red1 corresponded with high-quantity (baseline: highvariability), Blue2 corresponded with low-quantity (baseline: lowvariability), Gray3 corresponded with high-variability (baseline: highquantity), and Gold4 corresponded with low-variability (baseline: low-quantity). Alternatively, in the DR condition the cues for the magnitudes and array dimensions were both reversed in relation to the baseline cue assignments, such that the cue initially assigned to a high magnitude array (high-quantity or high-variability) was assigned to a low magnitude array (low-quantity or lowvariability) and the cue which was initially assigned to a quantity dimension was assigned to variability dimension, and vice versa. In the DR condition, Red1 corresponded with lowquantity (baseline: high-variability), Blue2 corresponded with high-quantity (baseline: low-variability), Gray3 corresponded with a low-variability (baseline: high-quantity), and Gold4 corresponded with a high-variability (baseline: low-quantity).
Upon introduction to the experiment, monkeys initially were exposed to the baseline condition, and then they were randomly assigned to the SR and DR conditions (see Table 1 for order assignments). Following the assigned reversal condition, monkeys were returned to the baseline categorization-cue assignments used in the return-to-baseline condition (identified as SRB following SR the condition and DRB following the DR condition). Following the first return-to-baseline condition the monkeys were then exposed to the reversal condition (SR or DR) that they had not experienced earlier. Finally, monkeys experienced a second return-to-baseline condition.
Data analyses. Experiment 2, except where noted, used the same analysis methods used in Experiment 1. The source of interference in Experiment 2 was not magnitude equivalency beThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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tween the two dimensions; rather, the interference factor was determined by whether the irrelevant dimension value on the target array was facilitative or disruptive for a given reversal (or returnto-baseline) condition. As with Experiment 1, one model assessed whether novel clipart icons affected performance (via test probe trials) and another model assessed whether there were any species differences in categorization accuracy and choice latency. The global model was fit to the cumulative number of errors accrued as a function of reversal conditions (SR, DR, SRB, and DRB), the interference factor (facilitative or disruptive trial types), the irrelevant dimension homogeneity (IID or DID trial types), and their interactions. The reversal conditions were presented in a counterbalanced order, and to assess whether order effects were present in the data a model assessed the cumulative number of errors as a function of the conditions' order (first or second presentation). A baseline local model predicted the proportion of correct responses as a function of 500-trial blocks covering the first and last 500 trials in the condition, the interference factor, and the irrelevant dimension homogeneity factor. This model served as the base of comparison for accuracy performance in the reversals. Two separate local accuracy models predicted response accuracy in 500-trial blocks that covered the first (preacquisition) and last (postacquisition) 500-trial blocks for the SR, DR, SRB, and DRB conditions. The first model included the reversal conditions (SR and DR) and the second model included the return-to-baseline conditions (SRB and DRB). The models assessed the proportion correct responses as a function of the phase factor (pre-vs. postacquisition), condition factor (SR vs. DR and SRB vs. DRB), task switching factor, irrelevant dimension homogeneity factor (identical or differential irrelevant dimension; IDD or DID), interference factor (facilitative or disruptive), and their interactions.
Two separate local choice time models (one comparing performances in the SR condition to the DR condition and another comparing the SRB condition with the DRB condition) assessed the latency to make a choice as a function condition, trial-block, irrelevant dimension homogeneity, task-switching, trial outcome, interference, and their interactions.
Results
The Baseline condition showed a 95% accuracy that did not differ across the trial-block factor, the irrelevant dimension homogeneity factor, the interference factor, or their interactions (ps Ͼ 0.20). The best fitting model for evaluating the effect of novel test stimuli excluded the test-probe factor, the training trials accuracy was 93% and the test trials accuracy was 94%. Therefore, as in Experiment 1, specific clipart icons did not affect monkeys' categorization. Also, as in Experiment 1, the best fitting model excluded the species factor, demonstrating that capuchin and rhesus monkeys performed similarly. Table 1 shows the trial-blocks to acquisition for each condition in Experiment 2. The median trialsto-acquisition was 17,150 for the SR condition, 12,350 for the DR condition, 10,000 for the SRB condition, and 9,250 for the DRC. For reference, the median trials-to-acquisition for the introductory (IID) condition in Experiment 1 was 14,600.
Global analysis. Figure 7 shows the average cumulative number of errors obtained in Experiment 2. For the interference factor, there were fewer errors for the facilitative trial types than the disruptive trial types in the DID trials (ps Ͻ 0.001, for SR, SRB, & DRB conditions; p ϭ .03, for the DR condition), but no differences between the facilitative and disruptive trial types in the IID trials (ps Ͼ .99). There were no differences in cumulative number of errors between the SR and the DR conditions across any of the trial types (ps Ͼ .99), and there were also no differences between the SRB and DRB conditions (ps Ͼ .90) for any of the trial types. Thus, reversing both the magnitude and dimension aspects of the categorization cue in the DR and DRB conditions did not interfere with performances more than reversing just the dimension aspect of the cue in the SR and SRB conditions. Also, there were no differences in the average cumulative number of errors between monkeys as a function of the order of performing the SR and DR conditions (see Table 1 ; SR, p ϭ .85; DR, p ϭ 1.0; SRB, p ϭ 1.0; DRB, p ϭ .99).
Accuracy. For both the reversal (SR/DR) and return-tobaseline (SRB/DRB) conditions the best fitting models predicting accuracy included the phase, interference, and homogeneity factors. The models with the task-switching factor and condition factor did not perform better than the simpler models excluding those factors. The models with the interference factor (Reversal: 2 (13) ϭ 2873, p Ͻ .001; Return to Baseline: 2 (13) ϭ 3658, p Ͻ .001) and homogeneity factor (Reversal: 2 (13) ϭ 1201, p Ͻ .001; Return to Baseline: 2 (13) ϭ 1714, p Ͻ .001) performed over 1,000 times better than the simpler models excluding those factors. Figure 8 (top panels) shows the results from the reversal conditions, and the data from the SR and DR conditions are combined because the condition factor was not predictive of categorization accuracy. In the preacquisition phase (i.e., first 500 trials in a condition), categorization accuracy was hovering around chance for the IID trial types, but there was a slightly greater accuracy for the facilitative trials compared with disruptive trials (56% vs. 43%; z ϭ Ϫ5.67, p Ͻ .001), and for the DID trial types there was a substantially greater accuracy favoring facilitative trials (90% vs. 10%; z ϭ Ϫ32.04, p Ͻ .001). In the postacquisition phase there were no differences in accuracy for facilitative and disruptive trials in the IID trials (93% vs. 91%; z ϭ Ϫ2.80, p ϭ .10), but there was a lingering interference effect for the DID trials (98% vs. 82%; This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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SMITH AND BERAN z ϭ Ϫ15.50, p Ͻ .001). The disruptive trials produced a profound and persistent interference effect on accuracy during DID trials. Figure 9 (top panels) shows the results from the return-tobaseline conditions. In the preacquisition phase, the IID trials showed above chance accuracy, and there was evidence of irrelevant dimension interference with higher accuracy on facilitative trial types compared with and disruptive trial types (78% vs. 68%; z ϭ Ϫ5.05, p Ͻ .001). For the DID trials there was a strong interference effect with high accuracy in the facilitative trials and below chance accuracy in the disruptive trials (97% vs. 22%; z ϭ Ϫ32.03, p Ͻ .001). Like the reversal conditions, this interference was carried over from the prior condition, but in SRB and DRB conditions the interference was carried over from the prior reversal conditions. In the postacquisition phase, there was no facilitative/disruptive trial interference for the IID trials (95% vs. 95%; z ϭ 0.50, p ϭ 1.0), but a residual interference for the DID trials (98% vs. 85%; z ϭ Ϫ15.16, p Ͻ .001).
Choice time. The reversal and return-to-baseline models predicted that the latency to make a choice was best predicted by the trial-block, irrelevant dimension homogeneity, interference, and outcome factors. The model including the interference factor was over 1,000 times more likely than the simpler model (Reversals: 2 (39) ϭ 1044, p Ͻ .001; Return to Baseline: 2 (39) ϭ 1251, p Ͻ .001), the model including the outcome factor was over 1,000 times more likely than the simpler model (Reversals: 2 (39) ϭ 16,105, p Ͻ .001; Return to Baseline: 2 (13) ϭ 11,558, p Ͻ .001), and the model with the irrelevant dimension homogeneity factor was over 1,000 more likely than the simpler model (Reversals: 2 (13) ϭ 648, p Ͻ .001; Return to Baseline: 2 (13) ϭ 325, p Ͻ .001). Figures 8 and 9 (bottom panels) depict the latency to make a choice as a function of irrelevant dimension homogeneity, phase, interference, and trial outcome for the reversal and return-to-baseline conditions, respectively. Because the condition factors were not statistically This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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TASK SWITCHING IN MONKEYS different, data from both the SR and DR and the SRB and DRB are combined in the analyses. For the reversal conditions (Figure 8 , bottom panels), in the IID trials, the latency to make a choice during the preacquisition phase was longer prior to correct responses on facilitative trial types (1.89 s vs. 1.69 s; z ϭ Ϫ5.21, p Ͻ .001), but not disruptive trial types (z ϭ 2.80, p ϭ .27). In the postacquisition phase, there were no differences in choice latencies between correct and incorrect responses for both the facilitative (z ϭ 3.14, p ϭ .12) and disruptive trial types (z ϭ 2.69, p ϭ .33). For the DID trials, in the preacquisition phase the latency to make a choice was relatively longer prior to an incorrect response for facilitative trial types (1.95 s vs. 1.75 s; z ϭ 4.30, p Ͻ .001), but longer prior to a correct response for disruptive trial types (2.21 s vs. 1.59 s; z ϭ Ϫ11.84, p Ͻ .001). In the postacquisition phase, the latency to make a choice was again longer for incorrect responses for the facilitative trial types (2.06 s vs. 1.61 s; z ϭ 6.35, p Ͻ .001), but there was no outcome difference for disruptive trial types (z ϭ Ϫ0.98, p ϭ 1.0).
For the return-to-baseline conditions ( Figure 9 , bottom panels), in the IID trials for the preacquisition phase, the latency to make a choice was longer prior to incorrect response on facilitative trial types (1.99 s vs. 1.75 s; z ϭ 5.56, p Ͻ .001), but no outcome difference on disruptive trial types (z ϭ 0.20, p ϭ 1.0). In the postacquisition phase, there was longer latencies preceding incorrect responses in both the facilitative (1.86 s vs. 1.56 s; z ϭ 6.41, p Ͻ .001) and disruptive (1.80 s vs. 1.61 s; z ϭ 3.86, p ϭ .01) trial types. For the DID trials, in the preacquisition phase the latency to make a choice was longer prior to an incorrect response for facilitative trial types (2.04 s vs. 1.64 s; z ϭ 5.39, p Ͻ .001), but longer prior to a correct response for disruptive trial types (2.13 s vs. 1.89 s; z ϭ Ϫ4.93, p Ͻ .001). In the postacquisition phase, the latency to make a choice was longer preceding incorrect responses for the facilitative trial types (1.51 s vs. 1.95 s; z ϭ 6.22, p Ͻ .001), but there was no outcome difference for disruptive trial types (z ϭ 3.08, p ϭ .15).
Discussion
The first aim of Experiment 2 was to assess whether the monkeys would rapidly reacquire the categorization rules following the return-to-baseline conditions. The return-to-baseline conditions did appear to show faster rates of reacquisition, and within the first Figure 9 . Experiment 2 -the proportion of correct categorizations (top two panels) and the average time to make a choice (bottom four panels) for the return-to-baseline conditions. All other characteristics are similar to Figure 8 . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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SMITH AND BERAN ϳ75% for the IID trials, suggesting that the monkeys promptly recalled the task rule for the baseline conditions. However, this effect might be attributable to the associative history, and the strong interference effects reported in the first 500 trials for the DID trials would appear to be more consistent with that hypothesis. If the monkeys did quickly reapply a task-rule, although interference in the DID trial types would still be expected, the magnitude of the interference should not appear to be overwhelming (e.g., ϳ22% accuracy in disruptive trials). Although reacquisition appeared to be faster in the return-to-baseline conditions, it still required around 10,000 trials for monkeys to meet criterion.
The second aim of this experiment was to investigate the effect of the categorization cue reassignment on producing profound interference on performances. It was clear that upon introduction into the reversal condition that the monkeys' categorizations were driven by tracking the irrelevant dimension that was previously relevant given the categorization cue, a result consistent with what has been reported with humans where cue reversals were more disruptive than simply using novel cues (Gade & Koch, 2007) . When the irrelevant dimension-magnitude was differential between the two array options, a profound interference effect was observed where facilitative trial types showed Ͼ90% accuracy attributable to the monkeys erroneously making the correct response by following the prereversal rules, while disruptive trial types showed Ͻ10% accuracy. When the 80% or greater acquisition criterion was met, with 2,000 or more trials maintaining that criterion, the disruptive trial type showed Ͻ85% accuracy while the other trial types showed Ͼ95% accuracy. Together this shows that the interference effect was both profound and prolonged in terms of affecting accuracy. When the irrelevant dimensionmagnitude was identical between the two array options the accuracy did not change profoundly between facilitative and disruptive trial types and was near chance. This was predicted because, unlike the differential irrelevant dimension conditions, the irrelevant dimension was the same between both arrays and the prereversal rules would not be useful in guide responding.
Curiously, however, in both the reversal and return-to-baseline conditions there was still a facilitative and disruptive effect reported for the identical irrelevant dimension-magnitude trials (e.g., when the irrelevant dimension had the correct prereversal dimension overlaid over both arrays then accuracy was higher than when the irrelevant dimension had the incorrect prereversal dimension on both arrays). It is not immediately clear why this would be the case, unless the monkeys' choices in the differential irrelevant dimension trials were affecting (priming) responses in the identical irrelevant dimension trials (even to their detriment). The data from the return-to-baseline conditions appear to resemble the data from the reversal conditions, including strong interference effects (during preacquisition) in the differential irrelevant dimension trials and little interference effects in the identical irrelevant dimension trials. In the postacquisition phase, there remained a lingering interference effect observed on the differential irrelevant dimension trials, but in this case, it was associative interference that stems from the prior experience in the reversal condition. However, as mentioned above, in the identical irrelevant dimension trials, overall accuracy was hovering around 75% in the preacquisition phase; this clearly demonstrates that the prior experience in the original baseline condition was somewhat preserved. Overall, it appears that the sources of interference from experience compound over time, and the return-to-baseline conditions showed long-term history effects of both the original baseline experiences and of the previously experienced reversal conditions. The monkeys were not given excessive postacquisition overtraining to determine at what point prior sources of interference disappeared, but the apparent magnitude of the effect and the compounded nature of the effect would suggest it might require a substantial number of trials.
Experiment 2 revealed more about the circumstances under which the choice latencies were relatively longer prior to correct and incorrect responses. In the preacquisition phase of the reversal conditions, there was a relatively longer latency prior to a correct response for the facilitative IID trials and for the disruptive DID trials, but the facilitative DID trials showed a shorter latency for correct responses. By the time the postacquisition phase of the return-to-baseline condition occurred, there were shorter latencies prior to a correct response in the IID trials (where accuracy was around 95%) and in the facilitative DID trials (corresponding with 97% accuracy). But, there was not a significant difference for the disruptive differential trial types (where accuracy was at about 85%). This pattern suggests that when trials were challenging (i.e., where there is often low accuracy, such as when there are disruptive trial types or when task acquisition has yet to be completed) the monkeys produced longer latencies to make a correct choice. However, when trials were easy (i.e., facilitative trials or trials where task fluency has occurred), then monkeys promptly made a correct response, but a longer choice latency was present prior to an incorrect response. This could reflect a cognitive system (i.e., controlled processing) that is mediating choices on challenging trials, where the time prior to making a correct choice was necessary for selective attention processes that requires working memory (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003) .
General Discussion
The present series of experiments have demonstrated that capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys, like pigeons, can learn to categorize arrays of stimuli based upon quantity and variability dimensions and that they can flexibly switch between these two tasks. Furthermore, the pattern of errors that the monkeys displayed was similar to what was reported with pigeons (Castro & Wasserman, 2016; Experiment 1) ; that is, they made fewer errors when the magnitudes of the two dimension-magnitudes were equivalently high magnitude. These results indicate that those processes that were involved with the pigeons' categorizations were also involved with the monkeys' categorizations. Also, in the present experiment the capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys performed similarly in terms of trials to task acquisition, percent accuracy across phases, the types of errors the monkeys made, and the effects on response latency. Overall, this similarity in performances further suggests that the basic mechanisms that governed capuchin monkeys (a New World monkey species) and rhesus macaques (an Old World monkey species) categorization were the same. Smith et al. (2012) demonstrated a similar effect between rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys; thus, such a similarity would not be unexpected. However, the two species do appear to show differences in other cognitive tasks (e.g., metacognition is more easily found in rhesus monkeys than in capuchin monkeys; Smith, Beran, Couchman, Coutinho, & Boomer, 2009 The monkeys' data never showed any evidence of switch costs across all the experiments. As mentioned previously, switch costs are frequently absent in cognitive control studies with nonhuman animals (Avdagic et al., 2014; Castro & Wasserman, 2016; Meier et al., 2016a; Stoet & Snyder, 2003a; however, see Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011) and this suggests that although nonhuman animals display cognitive-like performances, they might not be governed by the same processes as in humans (Monsell, 2003) . Dreisbach, Goschke, and Haider (2007) showed that humans do not show switch costs when they associatively memorize the appropriate response keys to the appropriate stimuli, suggesting that task-switching performances can be accomplished without guidance by a rule-set. However, for humans, rule following is the dominant form of completing the task, as evidenced by switch costs emerging in humans after they are given a rule, even if they learned to make choices associatively prior to being given the rule (Dreisbach et al., 2007) . Given this, the absence of switch costs with monkeys in prior research and in the present study is still interesting, because capuchin and rhesus monkeys display rule-based categorizations in tasks where humans comparatively also show rule-based categorizations, though humans had a more accurate performance and they acquired the task much more quickly than monkeys (Smith et al., 2010) . Thus, we anticipated that there might at least be some, albeit weak, evidence of task switching in monkeys in the present experiments. Pigeons, on the other hand, did not show any evidence of rule-based discrimination performances in Smith and colleagues' (2012) procedure; and as such we would not have expected switch costs. The failure to find rule-governed categorizations in the present task may not indicate that it is impossible, however. Procedural aspects in the present study might have prevented the monkeys from using a rule-based approach to categorize the stimuli. First, the monkeys were all trained on both dimensions simultaneously through trial and error rather than individually, unlike the Smith et al. (2010) task where the monkeys only had to learn to attend to one of two presented dimensions (i.e., they only had one task). However, in the Smith et al. task, monkeys (and humans) learned more slowly when categorization required the categorization based upon two dimensions varying between the two categorization groups. The present procedures resembled the associative condition and thus an associative system may have been used to solve the problem. If associative learning and rule-based learning were both viable candidate mechanisms to solve the problem, then perhaps the present procedure encouraged associative learning as a more efficient mechanism.
The absence of switch costs was not the only evidence suggesting that associative learning predominately, but perhaps not exclusively, governed performances. The monkeys, although skilled at the general procedural rules of the return-to-baseline condition of Experiment 2, showed profound disruption in the DID trials immediately following the reversal. Rather than abruptly relearning the task-rules, the monkeys continued to make hundreds of errors prior to showing acquisition mastery. This is an outcome predicted by a hypothesis assuming a slow associative learning process. The data from the IID trials in the return-to-baseline conditions, however, might suggest that some baseline categorization rules were encoded. The monkeys showed approximately 75% accuracy within the first 500 trials (note: this could be accomplished in less than a single session) on the IID trial types, and this suggests that the monkeys had some "savings" from the prior baseline experience that allowed them to pick up the task promptly. The nature of these savings is not known-it could be that the monkeys recalled the task rules and flexibly applied them to the familiar task contingencies, or it is also possible that the monkeys had a latent associative memory for the baseline task that resurged after the new rules were reapplied. Given that the monkeys in Experiment 2 showed long-lasting facilitation and disruption effects from prior conditions and that they still required thousands of trials to meet the acquisition criteria, savings from an associative-like mechanism seems like a strong possibility.
The results from the present experiments do not exclusively support a claim that monkeys solve the categorization problems entirely through associative processes. Prior to acquisition on a given condition (Experiments 1 and 2) or prior to a disruptive trial (Experiment 2), the monkeys tended to show a longer choice latency prior to a correct categorization. The longer choice latency prior to making correct responses on challenging trials may suggest a cognitive control mechanism is mediating effective judgments. One possible mechanism is that the monkeys were recalling the categorization-cue and choice-option information in working memory to formulate a response (Monsell, 2003) . However, if that was the case, then one might predict that the monkeys' choice latencies would have lengthened in Experiment 1 when the IID condition transitioned to the DID condition, because the two arrays would differ on both the target and irrelevant dimensions and the added information would have taxed such processes. A second, more likely, possibility is that those latencies reflected executive attention and response inhibition (Beran et al., 2016; Washburn, 2016) . This is evidenced by the monkeys learning to identify the relevant task dimension corresponding to the categorization cue and occasionally being able to effectively withhold a prepotent impulse to choose the incorrect array on disruptive trials in the reversal conditions of Experiment 2. Stoet and Snyder (2003b) reported that rhesus monkeys in a task-switching procedure (where the task-cue offset and the target stimulus onset were separated by a delay) made fewer errors and had faster RTs when they had a longer delay to prepare to make a response. In light of their data, it is possible that in the present study the latency to make a correct response during challenging trials might also reflect the need for the monkeys to prepare a response. Across the experiments, following acquisition, the latencies to make a choice were generally faster for correct responses. This suggests that when the monkeys became fluent in the tasks they could automatically/habitually choose the correct option. Thus, when the task was challenging the monkeys required more time to make an effective response and this may reflect the presence of a cognitive control process (e.g., like someone needing to "pay attention" to successfully navigate a novel environment). However, once the monkeys mastered the task an automatic/associative process could permit fast and efficient responding (e.g., like someone being able to "thoughtlessly" navigate a familiar environment with success).
Experiment 2 demonstrated that reversing the categorization cue associations between the two tasks would result in associative interference. As in the numerical Stroop task (Washburn, 1994 (Washburn, , 2016 , the monkeys' expert-like performance (i.e., ϳ95% accuracy) on the baseline categorization condition made relearning the categorization rules much more challenging, especially on trials where the incorrect stimulus array contained the dimensionmagnitude that was formerly correct for the baseline categorization This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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SMITH AND BERAN rule. The carryover effect of the baseline experiences and reversal experiences appeared to compound by benefiting performances in the return-to-baseline conditions in the IID trials but hindering performances in the disruptive DID trials. The prolonged interference of accuracy observed in Experiment 2 is similar to the prolonged interference effects reported in Avdagic et al. (2014) , where they reported that interference caused by having to serially interact with stimuli that varied on two dimensions also was persistent after prolonged training (although the interference was not caused by contingency reversals). As mentioned by Avdagic and colleagues, this is not necessarily found in accuracy data using human subjects (they often show prolonged effects with reaction time data). Washburn (2016) demonstrated this dissociation between monkeys and humans and further showed that humans can suppress interference effects if given added incentives to do so. This might suggest that humans have a cognitive control system that is more effective at filtering out sources of interference. The argument that the monkeys appear to be solving the categorization tasks using associative mechanisms does not preclude the possibility that the monkeys can use (and perhaps, in the present study, may have used) cognitive control mechanisms to categorize stimuli in task-switching procedures. Also, when considering species differences between human and nonhuman cognitive-control performances, we should not discount the possibility that associative mechanisms are heavily implicated in human cognitive-control performances. Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, and Verguts (2016) argued that cognitive control in humans also can be parsimoniously understood by considering the associative mechanisms that link perceptual, behavioral, and goal representations. Abrahamse et al. asserted that some cognitive control performances are context-specific and do not spontaneously generalize across tasks, which suggests that performances reflecting cognitive control might need to be learned on a task-specific basis. They also stated that cognitive control tasks often occur outside of awareness of the human participant, and thus performances can occur in the absence of explicit rules. However, Meier et al. (2016b) demonstrated that explicit rules can be important with human task switching performance. Pigeons, while appearing to lack an advantage in unidimensional categorization learning (Smith et al., 2012) , do demonstrate that they are capable of displaying postacquisition performances in categorizing that is not distinguishable from human performances (Wills et al., 2009 ). As such, it is possible that humans, pigeons, and monkeys do not qualitatively differ in their capacities to categorize stimuli and resolve conflicts, but apparent differences are due to procedural differences in the assessment of those capacities and/or the qualitative differences in how efficient those capacities operate between species. Future comparative research into cognitive control may need to assess when and how nonhuman animals show more cognitive control-like performances and that humans show more associative control-like performances. The research into the interplay of associative and cognitive mechanisms found in nonhuman animals can be instrumental in highlighting the most basic mechanisms that might be found in humans.
To summarize, although monkeys dissociate from pigeons when it comes to developing a rule-governed categorization repertoire, the monkeys' performances in the present study were very similar to what was observed in Castro and Wasserman (2016) . Much of the monkeys' performances could be well understood by hypothesizing underlying associative processes (e.g., no switch costs, insensitivity to nontarget stimuli, and slow rates of task acquisition and reversal acquisition). However, certain aspects of performances may hint at the possibility that nonassociative cognitive control mechanisms are involved (e.g., rapid reacquisition in the return-to-baseline conditions for the noninterference trials and longer latencies prior to correct responses on challenging trials that may reflect executive attention or inhibition processes that allow the monkeys to eventually learn the reversal contingencies without relying on slow associative extinction processes).
